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Driven to Distraction:
Extraneous Events
and Underreaction to Earnings News
Abstract
Psychological evidence indicates that it is hard to process multiple stimuli and per-
form multiple tasks at the same time. This paper tests the investor distraction hypothe-
sis, which holds that the arrival of extraneous news causes trading and market prices to
react sluggishly to relevant news about a firm. Our test focuses on the competition for
investor attention between a firm’s earnings announcements and the earnings announce-
ments of other firms. We find that the immediate stock price and volume reaction to
a firm’s earnings surprise is weaker, and post-earnings announcement drift is stronger,
when a greater number of earnings announcements by other firms are made on the same
day. Distracting news has a stronger effect on firms that receive positive than negative
earnings surprises. Industry-unrelated news has a stronger distracting effect than related
news. A trading strategy that exploits post-earnings announcement drift is unprofitable
for announcements made on days with little competing news.
[Attention] is the taking possession by the mind in clear and vivid form, of
one out of what seem several simultaneously possible objects or trains of
thought...It implies withdrawal from some things in order to deal effectively
with others.
William James, Principles of Psychology, 1890
Almost a quarter of British motorists admit they have been so distracted by
roadside billboards of semi-naked models that they have dangerously veered
out of their lanes.
Reuters (London), November 21, 2005
1 Introduction
Since minds are finite, attention must be allocated selectively. When individuals try
to process multiple information sources or perform multiple tasks simultaneously, per-
formance suffers.1 Indeed, conscious thought requires a focus on particular ideas or
information to the exclusion of others.
These elemental facts suggest that limited attention affects the perceptions and be-
havior of investors. Specifically, an investor’s effort to understand the implications of
a news announcement by one firm for that firm may interfere with the processing of
information about another firm arriving at the same time. Although there is recent
empirical research on the effects of limited investor attention on securities prices, this
basic prediction has not to our knowledge been tested.
A recent theoretical literature models how constraints on processing multiple infor-
mation signals affects beliefs perceptions and security market prices.2 These models
imply that investor neglect of information signals can lead to serial correlation in as-
set return volatility (Peng, Xiong, and Bollerslev (2006)), mispricing that is related to
publicly available accounting information (Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003)), excessive asset
price comovement (Peng and Xiong (2006)), faster rate of incorporation of information
by large than by small stocks (Peng (2005)), and neglect of long-term public information
(DellaVigna and Pollet (2007)). There has also been analysis of how firms can exploit
limited investor attention by disclosing bad news at times when other firms are making
1See, e.g., Kahneman (1973), Riley and Roitblat (1978), Pashler (1998); Baddeley (1990) reviews
interference effects in the recall of stored information.
2Research that examines the effects of limited attention on individual decisions such as trading
include Sims (2003), Gabaix, Laibson, Moloche, and Weinberg (2006), and Gabaix and Laibson (2004).
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salient disclosures (Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh (2004)), or on days of the week when
investors are less attentive (DellaVigna and Pollet (2006)).
In the models of DellaVigna and Pollet (2006) and Hirshleifer and Teoh (2005), in-
vestors are risk averse, and a subset neglect the information contained in a firm’s latest
earnings realization about future profitability. In equilibrium stock prices underreact to
earnings surprises, so that prices are on average too low after favorable surprises and
too high after unfavorable surprises. In consequence, positive surprises predict high sub-
sequent returns and negative surprises predict low subsequent returns. In other words,
there is post-earnings announcement drift, as documented by Bernard and Thomas
(1989).
A further empirical implication of these models is that when the amount of attention
investors direct toward a firm decreases, there should be more severe underreaction to
its earnings surprises, intensifying subsequent drift. We argue here that the amount of
attention toward a given firm is likely to be smaller when there are more extraneous
news events distracting investors from that firm.3 Therefore, greater distraction implies
more severe underreaction to the firm’s earnings news – a weaker immediate reaction
to the earnings surprise, and stronger post-earnings announcement drift. Intuitively, we
also expect that the greater the distraction, the weaker the trading volume response to
a news announcement.
Together, we call these predictions the investor distraction hypothesis. In this paper
we test the investor distraction hypothesis by measuring when a greater number of
public disclosures by other firms compete for investor attention; and whether greater
distraction reduces volume of trade.
For at least two reasons, the stock market’s processing of a firm’s earnings announce-
ments provides an attractive test of whether investors are able to filter away extraneous
news. First, earnings announcements are frequent, quantifiable, and directly value-
relevant. Second, several pieces of evidence suggest that limited attention affects stock
price reactions to a firm’s earnings announcements. The post-earnings announcement
drift anomaly (Bernard and Thomas (1989)) suggests that some investors at least tem-
porarily neglect the information in earnings surprises about future profitability. Fur-
thermore, there is evidence that market reactions to earnings announcements are more
prompt and complete when there is reason to think investors are paying attention to
earnings: during trading hours rather than non-trading hours (Francis, Pagach, and
Stephan (1992), Bagnoli, Clement, and Watts (2005)), on non-Friday weekdays rather
3Distracting news may also create information processing bottlenecks for analysts. For example, an
internal review committee’s job of evaluating analyst reports is harder when there is more information
to process.
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than on Fridays as the weekend approaches (DellaVigna and Pollet (2006)), and during
up markets rather than down markets (Hou, Peng, and Xiong (2006)).
The competing news events that we examine are also earnings surprises. Since all
publicly traded U.S. firms need to make earnings announcements, earnings surprises
provide an extensive sample of distracting events. Of course, earnings announcements
by other firms can be relevant for the value of a given test firm. Indeed, there is literature
that tests whether earnings announcements conveys information across firms. However,
even if such information transfer exists, each firm’s earnings announcement is typically
much more informative about its own value than about the value of other firms. Thus,
if attention is limited, earnings announcements by other firms can call investor attention
away from the purpose of valuing the given firm. Such distraction by extraneous news
can potentially weaken the market reaction to its earnings surprise.
Our study adds to a recent literature that provides evidence suggesting that lim-
ited attention may affect both market prices and the decisions of investors and financial
professionals. Evidence that stock prices underreact to public news events4, and that
information seems to diffuse gradually across industries, between large and small firms,
between economically linked firms, and between firms that are followed by different num-
bers of analysts5 is consistent with limited attention causing investors to neglect public
information (although other possible explanations have also been offered). Evidence that
the stock market sometimes reacts to previously-published news6 suggests that relevant
information is neglected at the time of the previous news. Some studies test for the
effects of limited attention by examining how investors trade in response to public news
arrival.7
The past empirical literature on investor attention discussed above has primarily fo-
cused on the neglect of public information signals, and on how greater publicity draws
4On the new issues puzzle, see Loughran and Ritter (1995); on the repurchase anomaly, see Ikenberry,
Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995); on other types of events, see the review of Hirshleifer (2001). Recent
papers also test whether investors neglect demographic information (DellaVigna and Pollet (2007)) and
information in oil prices (Pollet (2005)). Klibanoff, Lamont, and Wizman (1998) find that in typical
weeks closed-end country fund prices underreact to shifts in net asset value (NAV), but underreact
much less during weeks in which news about the country appears on the front page of the New York
Times. They argue that this news is redundant given NAV (which is publicly observable), and therefore
suggest that publicity about the country causes the greater reaction in the fund price.
5See, e.g., Brennan, Jegadeesh, and Swaminathan (1993), Cohen and Frazzini (2006), Hong, Lim,
and Stein (2000), Hong, Torous, and Valkanov (2007), Hou (2007); Hou and Moskowitz (2005) report
that delay-prone firms have anomalous returns.
6Ho and Michaely (1988); Huberman and Regev (2001) analyze in detail a case of a particular
company in which salient reporting of already-public information in the news media about a company
led to extreme price reactions.
7See, e.g., Barber and Odean (2006), Hirshleifer, Myers, Myers, and Teoh (2003), Linnainmaa (2007),
and Seasholes and Wu (2005).
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attention to the firm. A distinctive feature of our paper is that it focuses on the com-
peting signals that draw investor attention away from a given firm. In other words, our
aim is to test directly whether extraneous news distracts investors, causing market prices
to underreact to relevant news.
For our initial tests of the investor distraction hypothesis, we perform quarterly two-
way independent sorts of stocks based on the earnings surprise, and by the number
of earnings announcements by other firms on the same day as the firm’s earnings an-
nouncement. We call days with a large number of competing announcements “high-news
days,” as opposed to “low-news days.” We find that investors’ announcement date re-
actions to earnings news are significantly less sensitive to earnings news on high-news
days than on low-news days; the interdecile spread of announcement-period abnormal
returns between firms with high and low earnings surprises is 7.07% for low-news days
(the bottom number of announcements decile) and 5.67% for high-news days (the top
number of announcements decile).
To ensure that our results are not driven by seasonalities or cross-sectional differ-
ences in stock price reactions to earnings news, we also perform multivariate regressions
that control for the calendar effects (day of week, month, and year) on the sensitivity of
market reactions to earnings surprises, as well as the effect of size, book-to-market, the
number of analysts following, reporting lags, and institutional ownership. Using multi-
variate analysis, we find a similar result that the announcement date return response is
significantly less sensitive to earnings news when there is a greater number of competing
announcements on the same day.8
If competing news is distracting, it may also weaken the trading volume response to
earnings announcements. Using regression analysis, we find that the abnormal trading
volume response to earnings is significantly weakened when the earnings announcement
occurs on a high-news day than on a low-news day. Together, these announcement-
period volume and return findings are consistent with competing news events drawing
investor attention away from a firm’s earnings announcements, and thereby weakening
the initial price and trading response to these announcements.
To further test the investor distraction hypothesis, we examine whether post-earnings
announcement drift is stronger when earnings announcements occur on days with many
competing announcements. When we sort stocks based upon the earnings surprise and
by the number of earnings announcements on the same day, we find that the post-
earnings announcement drift is significantly stronger on high news days. For high-
8In the previous version, we used the residual number of announcements after regressing the number
of announcements on day of week, month, and year dummy variables as a measure of distraction and
found similar results.
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news days, the interdecile spread of the post-announcement 60-day cumulative abnormal
returns between high earnings surprise firms and low earnings surprise firms is 7.41% and
significant at the 1% level. The spread is only 2.81% and marginally significant at the
10% level for low-news days. Regression analyses also confirm that post-announcement
drift is significantly stronger for earnings announcements made on days with a greater
number of competing announcements after controlling for other possible determinants
of drift.
Taken together, the univariate and multivariate findings that high-news days are
associated with a lower sensitivity of announcement abnormal returns to earnings news,
with a higher sensitivity of post-announcement abnormal returns to earnings news, and
with a lower trading volume response to earnings news, support the investor distraction
hypothesis.
When we examine market reactions to positive and negative earnings news separately,
we find that the distraction effect is greater in firms receiving positive earnings news. A
possible explanation lies in the fact that attention-drawing events including extreme news
for a given firm are on average associated with individual investor purchases (Barber
and Odean (2006)). After negative news, this amounts to contrarian trading, which
tends to mute the market response to the surprise, whereas after positive news, this is
positive feedback trading, which tends to strengthen the immediate market response to
the surprise.
There may be reasons other than distraction why the number of competing announce-
ments affects the sensitivity of returns to earnings. As discussed in Section 4, it is not
entirely obvious why this should be the case. One possible reason is that the number
of competing announcements affects the informativeness of a given firm’s earnings sur-
prise. However, the distraction hypothesis implies that the number of competing news
announcements has opposite effects on the immediate reactivity of the firm’s stock to
its earnings surprise, versus the post-event reactivity. To compete with the distraction
hypothesis, any alternative explanation faces the hurdle of explaining these opposite
effects.
Our findings also suggest that an investor who seeks to exploit post-earnings an-
nouncement drift can gain by taking into account the amount of competing news on
earnings announcement dates. To test whether the number of competing news an-
nouncements is useful information for trading strategies, we form portfolios based upon
earnings surprises and upon the number of competing events on the day of earnings
announcement. At the end of each month, we perform an independent double sort of
stocks into 5 × 5 = 25 groups based on their most recent quarterly earnings announce-
ments within the preceding three months and the number of announcements on the
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announcement day. The portfolio that is long in good earnings news firms and short in
bad earnings news firms within the lowest number of announcements quintile is called
the “low-news portfolio.” Similarly, the long-short earnings portfolio formed from firms
with the highest number of announcements is termed the “high-news portfolio.”
We find that taking into account extraneous news is useful for portfolio trading
strategies. The Fama-French three-factor alphas associated with these portfolios differ
significantly across the number of announcements quintiles; the 3-factor alpha is 1.64%
per month and highly significant for the high-news portfolio, while it is 0.77% and
insignificant for the low-news portfolio.
Different competing announcements may affect attention differently. Investors who
follow only a particular sector may find earnings announcements by same-industry firms
more distracting than announcements by firms in other industries. On the other hand,
the opposite effect is also possible that announcements by same-industry firms help
investors react more efficiently to a given announcement. For example, the announce-
ment of record-high earnings by Pixar might attract more investor attention to other
entertainment firms’ earnings announcements on the same day, either because of greater
press coverage of the entertainment industry on that day, because the announcement
inherently draws investor attention to the entertainment industry, or because a focus
on one entertainment firm makes it easier for investors to process information about
entertainment industry firms. If such attention-drawing effects occur, the news about
Pixar should then distract investors from earnings announcements by firms in different
industries.
This suggests that there may be a difference between the effect of industry-related
versus industry-unrelated announcements on the attention that investors devote to the
earnings announcements of a given firm. To test for such a difference, we separate
competing announcements into related and unrelated announcements, using the Fama-
French 10 industry classification to measure industry relatedness. We find that a greater
number of unrelated announcements reduces the sensitivity of announcement-period re-
turns to earnings news, consistent with the results using the total number of announce-
ments. Furthermore, this distraction effect is stronger for unrelated announcements
than related announcements. Similarly, a greater number of unrelated announcements
significantly strengthens post-earnings announcement drift; and does so more strongly
than does related news.
Overall, our evidence about announcement period returns, post-earnings announce-
ment drift, and trading volume responses are generally consistent with the investor
distraction hypothesis. These findings therefore suggest that limited investor attention
affects investor behavior and capital market prices.
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2 Psychological Basis for Distraction Effects
Psychologists have provided a great deal of evidence that it is hard to process multiple
information sources or perform multiple tasks at the same time. The interfering effect
of extraneous information is illustrated by the famous Stroop task (Stroop (1935)), in
which subjects are asked to name the color in which a word is printed, when the word
does not match its print color, e.g., the word “blue” printed in red ink. When the
meaning of the word differs from its print color, subjects are slower to name its color,
as compared, e.g., with naming the color of a geometrical figure.
Selective attention involves the focus (conscious or otherwise) on a portion of a scene
or set of stimuli. In some studies of selective attention, individuals are asked to di-
rect their attention toward a stimulus, which interferes with the processing of another.
In studies of dichotic listening (Cherry (1953), Moray (1959), Broadbent (1958)), two
messages are separately and simultaneously played into a subject’s left and right ear
using headphones. In some studies, subjects are asked to attend to one of two messages,
and ‘shadow’ (repeat back) the words of this message. They are then asked questions
about the message they were not attending to. Subjects absorb very little information
about the unattended message—whether the voice was male or female, but not what
language was spoken or any of the words that were spoken, even if the same word is
spoken repeatedly
In visual studies of selective attention, participants often think that they have ab-
sorbed a scene fully when in fact they have only absorbed the subset of details upon which
they have focused. Selective attention leads to ‘change blindness’ (wherein a noteworthy
change in a visual scene is not noticed; see Simons and Levin (1997)). The phenomenon
of ‘inattentional blindness’ involves the failure to perceive task-unrelated stimuli while
performing a visual observation task. In such experiments, participants often fail to
notice even seemingly conspicuous events in the video scene they are observing—such
as a woman walking by in a gorilla suit, stopping, and beating her chest before moving
on (Simons and Chabris (1999)).
Studies of divided attention and dual task performance ask participants to attend to
multiple stimuli at the same time and to respond to them. In the auditory domain, a
dichotic listening experiment can be used to examine the effects of divided attention. In
such an experiment, subjects can be asked to pay attention to both messages, and later
can be asked about the content of each. Studies of dual task performance have found
that there is interference between tasks (see, e.g., Pashler and Johnston (1998)), and
that performance is much worse when the two tasks are similar, as with tasks involving
the same sensory modalities (McLeod (1977), Treisman and Davies (1973)).
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In a financial context, the problem of reacting to multiple earnings surprises by
revaluing two different stocks divides attention, and therefore may also be hard to do.
Performing valuations involves using similar kinds of information and types of cognitive
processing, potentially leading to interference between tasks. Regardless of whether this
is the case, more generally, time and cognitive constraints compel restricting attention
to a limited set of inputs and tasks.
An investor who tries to forecast firms’ prospects are faced with the arrival of many
information signals over time. Psychologists have studied experimentally how subjects
learn over time to forecast a variable that is stochastically related to multiple cues.9 A
consistent finding in both animal and human studies is that cue competition occurs: the
arrival of irrelevant cues causes subjects to use relevant cues less. In financial markets,
investors presumably try to economize on attention by filtering away irrelevant signals.
Nevertheless, psychological evidence of cue competition suggests that stock investors
may be more prone to underreact to relevant information about a firm when there is
greater arrival of irrelevant signals.
3 The Data
We use quarterly earnings announcement data from CRSP-Compustat merged database
and IBES from 1995 to 2004. To calculate the daily number of quarterly earnings
announcements, we look at quarterly earnings announcements available from CRSP-
Compustat merged database. When the announcement date is also available at IBES but
is different from Compustat date, we take the earlier date following the imputation rule
of DellaVigna and Pollet (2006).10 While the accuracy of the announcement date is likely
to be higher when it is available from both IBES and Compustat, we include Compustat
earnings announcements without matching IBES data when we compute the number
of competing announcements each day because IBES coverage is for relatively large
firms.11 Our sample firms are limited to those that have IBES coverage; we therefore
expect very accurate announcement dates for our sample even though the number of
competing announcements can be slightly noisy.
To estimate the forecast error (FE) as a measure of the earnings surprise, we cal-
culate the difference between announced earnings as reported by IBES (eiq) and the
consensus earnings forecast (Fiq), defined as the median of the most recent forecasts
9See, e.g., Baker, Mercier, Valleettourangeau, Frank, and Pan (1993), Busemeyer, Myung, and
McDaniel (1993), and Kruschke and Johansen (1999).
10DellaVigna and Pollet (2006) report that the accuracy of announcement dates imputed from IBES
and Compustat are almost perfect in the post-1994 period.
11According to Hong, Lim, and Stein (2000), 40% of CRSP firms are not covered by IBES in 1994.
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from individual analysts. To exclude stale forecasts when we calculate the consensus
forecast, we only include 1- or 2-quarter ahead forecasts issued or reviewed in the last
60 calendar days before the earnings announcement. If an analyst made multiple fore-
casts during that period, we take her most recent forecast. The difference between the
announced earnings and the consensus forecast is normalized by the stock price at the
end of the corresponding quarter (Piq), where earnings, forecasts, and stock prices are all
split-adjusted. To control for possible data errors, we delete observations when earnings
or forecasts are greater than the stock price, or when the stock price is less than $1
before split-adjustment.
FEiq =
eiq − Fiq
Piq
. (1)
The cumulative abnormal returns of the announcement window and the post-announcement
window are defined as the difference between the buy-and-hold return of the announcing
firm and that of a size and book-to-market (B/M) matching portfolio over the windows
[0, 1] and [2, 61] in trading days relative to the announcement date,
CAR[0, 1]iq =
t+1∏
k=t
(1 +Rik)−
t+1∏
k=t
(1 +Rpk)
CAR[2, 61]iq =
t+61∏
k=t+2
(1 +Rik)−
t+61∏
k=t+2
(1 +Rpk), (2)
where Rik is the return of the firm i and Rpk is the return of the matching size-B/M
portfolio on day k where t is the announcement date of quarter q’s earnings.
We choose 60 trading days for the post-announcement window because Bernard and
Thomas (1989) report that most of the drift occurs during the first 60 trading days after
the announcement (about three calendar months). Each stock is matched with one of
25 size - B/M portfolios at the end of June based on the market capitalization at the
end of June and B/M, the book equity of the last fiscal year end in the prior calendar
year divided by the market value of equity at the end of December of the prior year.
The daily returns of 25 size - B/M portfolios are from Kenneth French’s website.12
4 The Effect of Competing News on Announcement
Date Returns, Volume, and Post-Earnings An-
nouncement Drift
We specify the investor distraction hypothesis as containing three parts:
12http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data library.html
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Hypothesis 1a: The sensitivity of the announcement abnormal return to earnings news
decreases with the number of competing announcements.
Hypothesis 1b: The abnormal trading volume on the day of announcement decreases
with the number of competing announcements.
Hypothesis 1c: The sensitivity of the post-announcement abnormal return to earnings
news increases with the number of competing announcements.
Hypotheses 1a and 1c predict opposite directions for the effect of the number of com-
peting news announcements on the announcement-period sensitivity of the firm’s stock
return to its earnings surprise, versus the sensitivity of the post-event return. This helps
distinguish the investor distraction hypothesis from alternative theories. For example, it
might be argued that competing news announcements affect the informativeness of the
firm’s earnings announcement. However, such an alternative theory predicts the same
direction of effect on the announcement period and the post-event sensitivity of returns
to the firm’s earnings surprise (holding constant the fraction of the total response to the
earnings surprise that is delayed).
4.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of daily number of quarterly earnings announce-
ments. The mean number of announcements a day is 120.8 and the median number is
71. The percentiles of the number of announcements show that there is a wide varia-
tion in the number of earnings announcements per day; the 10th percentile number of
announcements is 20 and the 90th percentile is 290. Earnings announcements seem to
cluster by day of week and show a highly seasonal pattern. As documented by other
studies, the number of announcements is higher on Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday,
and lowest on Friday (e.g., Damodaran (1989), DellaVigna and Pollet (2006)); the aver-
age number of announcements on Friday is 68.8, which is less than a half of the average
number of announcements on Thursday (152.2).
When examined by month, the number of announcements shows an approximately
3-month cycle, with the lowest number of announcements in March, June, September,
and December. This pattern reflects the fact that about 60% of the announcements are
for fiscal quarters ending in March, June, September, and December and that it takes
one to two months from the end of fiscal quarter until the earnings announcement date.13
13In 2002, SEC deadline for filing quarterly reports was 45 days of quarter end and 90 days of year
end for annual reports. The deadlines are now accelerated to 35 days for quarterly reports and 60 days
for annual reports for fiscal years ending on or after December 15, 2005.
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Table 2 shows the average size and book-to-market ratios by the decile rank of the
number of announcements. The decile rank is based on quarterly sorts of earnings
announcement observations by the number of announcements on the announcement
day. Earnings announcements on high-news days are from larger firms than those on
low-news days (p < 0.001), while there is no significant difference in book-to-market
ratios between the two extreme number of announcements deciles. However, the size and
book-to-market ratios are not monotonic across the number of announcement deciles.
Deciles 3 and 4 have relatively low size and high book-to-market ratios.
4.2 Announcement Date Returns and Post-Earnings Announce-
ment Drift
We first perform univariate analysis to examine the effect of competing news on price
reactions to earnings news. In each calendar quarter, we perform a two-way independent
sort of all quarterly earnings announcements observations in that quarter into 10 ×
10 = 100 groups based upon the number of earnings announcements on the day of the
earnings announcement and the earnings surprise (forecast error) as defined in Equation
(1). We exclude earnings announcements for which we lack the size or book-to-market
information of the announcing firm needed to calculate abnormal returns. For each
number of announcements decile, we calculate the mean announcement-period and post-
announcement cumulative abnormal returns for the most positive (FE10) and the most
negative earnings surprise deciles (FE1), and the difference of announcement and post-
announcement cumulative abnormal returns between the two extreme earnings surprise
deciles.
The spread of announcement-day abnormal returns between earnings surprise deciles
10 and 1 (FE10 − FE1) measures the stock price response to earnings news; a larger
spread indicates that investors react more strongly to earnings news on the announce-
ment date. The spread of post-announcement abnormal returns between earnings sur-
prise deciles 10 and 1 measures underreaction to earnings news as reflected in subsequent
drift. If the market is efficient, there will be no difference between good-earnings-news
and bad-earnings-news firms in their post-announcement abnormal returns. A positive
spread indicates underreaction to earnings news – positive abnormal returns following
good news and negative abnormal returns following bad news.
Table 3 shows that investors’ 2-day announcement reactions to earnings news are less
sensitive to earnings news when earnings are announced on high-news days (NRANK=10)
than low-news days (NRANK=1). For the lowest number of announcements decile (low-
news days), the mean spread in 2-day cumulative announcement returns (CAR[0,1])
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between good earnings news firms (FE10) and bad earnings news firms (FE1) is 7.07%,
whereas for the highest number of announcements decile, the mean spread is 5.67%.
This indicates that the price reactions to earnings news are stronger when earnings are
announced on low-news days than on high-news days.
Greater competing news is also associated with stronger post-earnings announcement
drift. The spread in mean 60-day post announcement abnormal returns (CAR[2,61])
between good and bad earnings news deciles indicates greater underreaction to earn-
ings news on high-news days than on low-news days. For high-news days, the post-
announcement abnormal return spread between extreme earnings surprise deciles is sub-
stantial (7.41%) and highly significant (p < 0.001), whereas the low-news days spread is
smaller (2.81%) and marginally significant(p = 0.055). However, the spread in the post
announcement abnormal returns is not monotonic across the number of announcements
deciles (NRANK). The source of this non-monotonicity may be differences in size and
B/M across the number of announcement deciles (see Table 2). Therefore, we con-
duct multivariate regression analysis in Subsection 5.1 to control for the effect of firm
characteristics such as size, book-to-market, and calendar effects (day of week, month,
or year) on the relation between announcement or post-announcement abnormal returns
and earnings news.
To examine the interaction effect of earnings surprise and the amount of competing
news, we use an ANOVA procedure to test if the abnormal returns spread between high
and low earnings surprise deciles is significantly different between low and high news
days. This is equivalent to testing the significance of the interaction term a3 in the
following regression, using all announcements in the top and bottom of the earnings
surprise deciles and top and bottom of the number of announcements deciles:
CAR = a0 + a1(FE10) + a2(NRANK10) + a3(FE10)(NRANK10) + ε, (3)
where FE10 is an indicator variable that is equal to 1 for the top decile of earnings
surprise, NRANK10 is an indicator variable that is equal to 1 for the top decile of the
number of announcements (high-news days), CAR = CAR[0, 1] for the announcement
date abnormal returns, and CAR = CAR[2, 61] for the post-announcement cumulative
abnormal return. Thus, the ANOVA procedure tests whether CAR spreads between
good and bad earnings news firms are different between high and low news days.
The ANOVA procedure confirms that a greater number of competing announcements
mutes the announcement-date stock price reaction to a firm’s earnings surprise. The last
row of Table 3 reports the difference between high and low news days. The difference
between high and low news days in interdecile spreads of CAR[0, 1] is −1.40% and
statistically significant (p = 0.033). The difference of interdecile spreads of CAR[2, 61]
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is 4.60%, and also statistically significant (p = 0.034).
Figures 1 and 2 provide graphical evidence that market reactions to earnings news
is weaker on the announcement day and subsequent drifts are stronger when earnings
are announced on high-news days than low-news days. In Figure 1, the abnormal an-
nouncement return (CAR[0,1]) is plotted against earnings surprise deciles, separately
for high-news days (Decile 10) and for low-news days (Decile 1). The market reaction is
less sensitive to earnings news on high-news days, as reflected by its flatter slope in the
graph. Furthermore, it appears that the difference in the sensitivity between high and
low news days is more pronounced among positive rather than negative earnings sur-
prises. We examine the distraction effect separately for positive and negative earnings
surprises later in Subsection 5.1.
Figure 2 shows the mean post-announcement abnormal returns (CAR[2,61]) as a
function of earnings surprise deciles. The slopes of the graphs show that post-announcement
abnormal returns are more predictable based on earnings news when earnings are an-
nounced on high-news days than low-news days, consistent with a more sluggish reaction
to earnings news announced on high-news days. Figures 1 and 2 and the univariate re-
sults in Table 3 suggest that investors react more sluggishly to earnings news when they
are distracted by competing announcements.
5 Regression Analysis
To control for other possible determinants of investor responses to earnings news, we
perform multivariate tests. Subsection 5.1 describes how competing news affects the
sensitivity of returns to a firm’s earnings news. Subsection 5.2 describes how competing
news affects the sensitivity of trading volume to a firm’s earnings news.
5.1 Distraction and the Return Response to Earnings News
In Subsubsection 5.1.1 we describe full sample tests. We perform additional analysis and
consider alternative explanations in Subsubsection 5.1.2. Then in Subsubsection 5.1.3
we provide tests in subsamples of positive versus negative earnings surprises.
5.1.1 Full Sample Tests
In order to control for possible sources of variation in the relation between announcement
date returns and earnings news and also between post-announcement drifts and earnings
news, we run regressions of two-day announcement abnormal return (CAR[0,1]) or 60-
day post-announcement abnormal return (CAR[2,61]) on the earnings surprise decile
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rank (FE), the number of announcements decile rank (NRANK), the interaction term
(FE×NRANK), control variables, also interacted with FE,
CAR = a0+a1FE+a2NRANK+a3(FE×NRANK)+
n∑
i=1
ciXi+
n∑
i=1
bi(FE×Xi)+ε. (4)
The investor distraction hypothesis posits that announcement return is less sensitive and
post-announcement return is more sensitive to earnings news on high news days. Thus,
we expect a3 < 0 when we use CAR[0,1] as dependent variable and a3 > 0 when we use
CAR[2,61] as dependent variable.
Following past literature, we use the decile rank of forecast error as opposed to the
forecast error itself. This reduces the influence of outliers, and linearizes the relation
between abnormal returns and the earnings surprise (see Figure 1). Previous research
shows that investor reactions to earnings news vary with firm size, book-to-market ra-
tios, number of analysts following, reporting lags, institutional ownership, and day of the
week.14 Thus, we include as control variables size and B/M deciles, the number of ana-
lysts following the firm during the most recent fiscal year (Log(1+# analysts following)),
reporting lags (the number of days from the quarter end until the announcement date),
institutional ownership, and day of week/month/year dummies. Institutional ownership
(IO) is the percentage of shares owned by institutions at the end of the most recent
calendar quarter constructed from the CDA/Spectrum 13F database. Standard errors
of regression coefficient estimates are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustering by
the day of announcement.
The regression results in Table 4 describe the sensitivity of the immediate stock
price reaction (CAR[0,1]) and the delayed response (CAR[2,61]) to the earnings sur-
prise as a function of the amount of competing news. The coefficient on the interac-
tion between earnings surprise rank and the number of competing announcements rank
(FE×NRANK) measures the effect of competing announcements on market reactions to
earnings news. For the announcement return (CAR[0,1]), the coefficient of the interac-
tion term (FE×NRANK) is negative (−0.021) and significant at the 1% level (Regression
1). Since the coefficient estimate for FE is 1.027, this implies that the market reactions
are about 20% less sensitive to earnings news on high-news days (NRANK=10) com-
pared to those on low-news days (NRANK=1).15
For post-announcement abnormal returns (CAR[2,61]), the coefficient on the inter-
action between earnings surprise decile rank and the number of announcements rank
(FE×NRANK) is positive (0.049) and significant at the 1% level after controlling for
14E.g., Bernard and Thomas (1989), Chambers and Penman (1984), DellaVigna and Pollet (2006).
15The sensitivity is 1.027− (0.021× 10) = 0.817 for NRANK=10 and 1.027− (0.021× 1) = 1.006 for
NRANK=1.
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the effect of size, B/M, analyst following, reporting lags, institutional ownership, and
day of week, month, and year (Regression 5).
Thus, consistent with the distraction hypothesis, distracting news has opposite effects
on the sensitivity of a firm’s announcement period returns to its earnings surprise versus
the sensitivity of its post-announcement reaction to its earnings surprise. These opposite
effects raise a challenging hurdle to alternatives explanations such as one based upon
the informativeness of earnings announcements.
We also examine whether the distraction effect varies with firm size, analyst follow-
ing, or institutional ownership. The distraction effect is measured by the coefficient esti-
mate of FE×NRANK, which is negative in the announcement-return regression (weaker
response for high-news day announcements) and positive in the post-announcement re-
gression (stronger drift after high-news day announcements). To test whether firm size,
analyst following, or institutional ownership affects the distraction effect, we include a
triple interaction term (FE×NRANK×Xi, where Xi=SIZE, Log(1+#Analysts), or IO)
in Regressions (2)-(4) and (6)-(8). There is weak evidence that the distraction effect is
stronger among firms with small market capitalizations, low analyst following, or low
institutional ownership. For example, FE×NRANK×SIZE is positive and significant
at 10% in Regression (2), implying that the distraction effect on announcement re-
turns (negative FE×NRANK) is muted among larger firms. For the post-announcement
drift, FE×NRANK×SIZE is negative and significant at 10% in Regression (6), implying
that the distraction effect on post-announcement returns (positive FE×NRANK) weaker
among larger firms.
5.1.2 Additional Analysis and Alternative Explanations
We consider several alternative explanations of our findings. First is the presence of
errors in announcement dates. The sensitivity of the announcement-day abnormal return
to earnings news can be weaker and the sensitivity of the post-announcement abnormal
return to earnings news stronger on high-news days if there are more errors in our
announcement dates in the top number of announcement decile (high-news days). If the
actual announcement date is later than our announcement date, our post-announcement
period [2,61] may include the actual announcement date. A higher incidence of such
errors among high news days could contribute to the weaker/stronger relation between
announcement/post-announcement abnormal returns and earnings surprises on high-
news days.
We check the accuracy of our announcement dates with the news-wire announcement
dates of DellaVigna and Pollet (2006).16 DellaVigna and Pollet (2006) hand-collected
16We thank Stefano DellaVigna for suggesting this robustness check and Stefano DellaVigna and
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2,766 randomly-selected earnings announcements from 1984 to 2003 using Lexis-Nexis
and the PR news-wires. We are able to match 159 out of 11,764 low-news day an-
nouncements (NRANK=1) with the news-wire announcement dates. Out of 159 an-
nouncements, 3 announcements are different from the news wire announcement dates;
two of our announcement dates are earlier than the news wire dates by 1 day, one
is earlier than the news wire date by 3 or more days. For high-news day announce-
ments (NRANK=10), 59 out of 12,185 announcements are matched with the news-wire
announcement dates and 3 of the matched announcements are different from the news-
wire dates; for all three, our dates are earlier than the news wire dates by one day. The
error rate is indeed greater in the high news days than low news days. However, the
sample is too small for the difference in error rates to be statistically significant.
To address the possible effect of errors in announcement dates on return sensitiv-
ities, we compute announcement and post-announcement abnormal returns using dif-
ferent windows. The dependent variable in Regression 1 in Table 5 is the abnormal
return over days [−1,1] of the announcement. Including day −1 can help in case the
actual announcement as reported in news wires is earlier than our announcement date
imputed from Compustat and IBES.17 When the actual announcement is later than our
announcement date, our post-announcement window may capture the actual announce-
ment date and therefore we could find stronger predictability of post-announcement
abnormal returns based on earnings news.18 To address this possibility, in Regression 2
in Table 5, we start the post-announcement window from day 3. We find that the results
are quite similar when we use different windows for computing announcement and post-
announcement abnormal returns. We therefore conclude that errors in announcement
dates are not likely to affect the results.
Second, it is possible that high-news days are associated with weaker reactions on the
announcement date because there is more leakage of earnings news before the announce-
ment. To address this possibility, in Regression 3 we examine 30-day abnormal returns
before the announcement. We find that in this pre-announcement period, the relation
between announcement abnormal returns and earnings news does not differ significantly
across NRANK. Thus, there is no indication of any difference in information leakage in
relation to NRANK.
One may argue that the number of distracting events affects the informativeness
of the firm’s earnings about fundamental value. We do not see any clear reason why
Joshua Pollet for providing the data.
17However, we did not find any such cases among our announcement dates matched with the news-wire
dates from DellaVigna and Pollet (2006).
18However, none of the actual (news-wire) announcement date falls in the post-announcement window
[2,61] for high-news day announcements in our matched announcement dates sample.
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the number of competing announcements should affect the informativeness of the given
firm’s earnings surprise or the sensitivity of its stock price to its own earnings surprise,
or any presumption as to which way such an effect would go. However, if a given firm’s
earnings were more informative at times when there are few competing announcements,
we would expect both the immediate and total price response to the firm’s earnings
announcement to be larger at such times. To evaluate this alternative hypothesis, we
test directly whether low-news days are associated with a stronger total sensitivity of
stock prices to earnings news. Regression 4 shows that the sensitivity of abnormal
returns over days [0,61] to earnings news, which measures the total impact of earnings
news on stock prices, does not differ across the number of announcement deciles.
Another alternative interpretation of our findings is that in the short run the amount
of capital available to sophisticated investors to arbitrage post-earnings announcement
drift is limited. Since in practice even short-selling requires capital, when NRANK is
high there are many competing uses for arbitrage capital (to exploit the large number
of earnings surprises). So even if there is no limited attention, high NRANK could
imply a lower immediate reaction to a given earnings surprise, and therefore stronger
post-announcement drift.
However, the arbitrage capital argument is actually ambiguous, because earnings
announcements can free up, rather than take up, arbitrage capital. If arbitrageurs have
already taken a position in a stock for any reason, then when it announces earnings and
uncertainty is resolve, arbitrageurs have an opportunity to reverse out their positions.
Furthermore, even if it be the case that arbitrageurs are on the whole committing
more rather than less capital in response to earnings surprises, the capital constraints
argument has a counterfactual implication. Professional arbitrageurs are most active in
large and more liquid stocks. This suggests that small naive investors would be more im-
portant for the price-setting of small stocks, and sophisticated professional arbitrageurs
would have the greatest influence on the prices of large and liquid stocks. If so, then
shocks to the scarcity of arbitrage capital will have a bigger effect on arbitrage activity
in larger stocks. Thus, the arbitrage capital argument implies that the distraction effect
should be greatest among larger stocks. However, our evidence in Table 4 indicates if
anything the opposite–the distraction effect seems stronger among small stocks.
5.1.3 Positive versus Negative Earnings Surprises
Past research has shown that stock returns are more sensitive to the size of positive
earnings surprises than the size of negative ones (Hayn (1995)). Since these reactions
are asymmetric, it is interesting to examine separately the effect of competing announce-
ments for positive and negative earnings surprises.
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Table 6 reports regression evidence for the positive and negative earnings surprise
subsamples. NRANK is the decile rank of the number of announcements as defined
earlier and FE is the quintile rank of the earnings surprise within each subsample of
positive or negative earnings surprises.
The effect of competing news on market reactions to earnings news is very different
in the two samples. As with the full sample, for positive earnings news, the number of
announcements significantly reduces the sensitivity of announcement abnormal return to
positive earnings news. Similarly, the number of announcements significantly increases
the sensitivity of post-announcement abnormal return to positive earnings news. For the
announcement return regression, the coefficient of the interaction term FE×NRANK is
−0.039 and significant at the 1% level, and in the post-announcement return regression
is 0.120 and significant at the 5% level.
In contrast, in the negative earnings news subsample, the effect of competing news
on the market reactions to news is insignificant for the immediate reaction, though it is
positive (0.156) and significant for long-term drift. While the coefficient of the interaction
term FE ×NRANK is greater for the negative surprise sample (0.156 versus 0.120), it
seems that the significance of the term FE×NRANK for the negative surprise sample is
driven not by underreaction, but by the relation between NRANK and the sensitivity of
the total price reaction to earnings news (in the regression with CAR[0,61] as dependent
variable, FE × NRANK is significant at the 5% level for the negative surprise sample
and insignificant for the positive surprise sample). Therefore, the results suggest that
distraction has a greater effect on underreaction to positive than to negative earnings.
A possible explanation lies in the fact that attention-drawing events, including ex-
treme news, are on average associated with individual investor purchases (Barber and
Odean (2006)). Barber and Odean suggest that this results from the combination of
limited attention, and the asymmetry between stock buying and selling. An investor
selects stocks to purchase from a potential universe of thousands of stocks, but sells are
mostly limited to the few stocks in the investor’s portfolio. Thus, extreme news about
a stock, whether good or bad, brings investor attention to that stock, and on average
leads to a greater preponderance of buying over selling.19
This suggests that attention-driven purchases after bad news may weaken market
reactions to this news. To the extent that distraction mutes attention-driven contrarian
trading after negative news, distraction can strengthen instead of weaken the immediate
response to the negative surprise. This effect can potentially offset the basic distraction
19Although their proxies for investor attention do not include distracting information, Hou, Peng, and
Xiong (2006) also provide evidence suggesting that attention has a larger effect on market reactions
to positive than to negative earnings news, and refer to the asymmetry between buying and selling
decisions.
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effect that motivates our tests.
The reasoning is different after good news, which, as shown by Barber and Odean, is
also associated with attention-driven buys. Such buying should tend to magnify the price
reaction to the positive news. To the extent that distraction mutes this attention-driven
buying after positive news, distraction will tend to weaken the immediate response to
the positive surprise. Thus, this effect potentially reinforces the basic distraction effect
that motivates our tests.
In summary, when we take into account that the effect of distraction is likely to be
different for investor buys and sells, there are possible offsetting effects on how distraction
affects price reactions to bad news; but the prediction remains unambiguous for the effect
of distraction on price reactions to good news.
5.2 Distraction and the Volume Response to Earnings News
The extent to which investors react to earnings news can also be measured by trading
volume in response to the earnings announcement. The investor distraction hypothesis
holds that competing announcements will mute the trading volume response to earnings
news.
We define abnormal volume on day j relative to the announcement date t as a
normalized difference between the log dollar volume on day j and the average log dollar
volume over days [−41,−11] of the announcement:
V OL[j] = Log (DollarV olt+j + 1)− 1
30
t−11∑
k=t−41
Log(DollarV olk + 1). (5)
We perform regression analysis of the abnormal trading volume on the announce-
ment day (VOL[0]) and also two days around announcement (VOL[0,1]). The two-day
abnormal trading volume is defined as the average of abnormal trading volumes on the
announcement date (VOL[0]) and on the following day (VOL[1]).
Since both extreme positive and negative earnings surprises are likely to generate
large trading volume, we regress the one- or two-day abnormal trading volume on the
decile rank of absolute earnings surprises (AFE), the number of announcement decile
rank (NRANK), and other control variables. In addition to the size, B/M, number of
analysts following, reporting lags, institutional ownership, and year/month/day of week
dummies we employed in the previous section, we also include market abnormal trading
volume during the same period (MKTVOL for one-day, MKTVOL2 for two-day window)
so that we are not capturing the market-wide variations in trading volumes. MKTVOL
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is the average abnormal volume of all CRSP firms on that day where the abnormal
volume of each firm is defined in a manner similar to (5).
Table 7 shows that the coefficient of NRANK is negative and significant at the
1% level in all regression models, indicating that both 1- and 2-day abnormal volume is
lower when earnings are announced on high-news days compared to low-news days, after
controlling for the effect of earnings news or size of earnings news, and market trading
volume, firm-characteristics, and calendar effects. To control for a possible non-linear
effect of earnings surprise on trading volume, we also use indicator variables for each
earnings surprise decile instead of the absolute earnings surprise decile rank (Regressions
3 and 6) and find similar results. Overall, the results show that investor reaction to
earnings news as measured by abnormal trading volume is weaker when earnings are
announced on high-news days.
6 Portfolio Trading Strategies
We now test whether investors can use the distraction effect to form better portfolios.
Based on the previous results, we expect investors to be able to achieve superior returns
by combining earnings surprise information with information about distracting news, as
measured by the number of competing earnings announcements.
At the end of each month from March 1995 until December 2004, we independently
sort stocks into 5×5 portfolios based on their most recent earnings surprises within
the last three months and the number earnings announcements on the day of earnings
announcement. We then calculate equally-weighted returns of each of the resulting 5×5
portfolios during the following month. Within each number of announcements quintile
(NRANK), we form a hedge portfolio that is long in the good news portfolio (FE =
5) and short in the bad news portfolio (FE = 1) and compute the return of the hedge
portfolio.
If investors underreact to earnings news, the good news portfolio will outperform
the bad news portfolio. Therefore, the abnormal return of the hedge portfolio will
be larger when there is stronger post-earnings announcement drift. Since quarterly
earnings announcements during the preceding three months are used to form portfolios,
the strategy uses most of CRSP stocks with quarterly earnings information and captures
up to three months of post-announcement returns. We measure monthly abnormal
performance of the portfolio using alphas from a time-series regression of the portfolio
return (less the risk-free rate except for the zero-cost hedge portfolios) on Fama-French
three factors.
Table 8 shows that a trading strategy designed to exploit post-earnings announce-
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ment drift achieves a higher abnormal return when implemented on earnings announce-
ments that occur on high-news days than on low-news days. The Good minus Bad
earnings news hedge portfolio 3-factor alpha is 1.64% per month and significant at the
1% level for the high-news portfolio (NRANK=5). The alpha is only 0.77% and insignif-
icant for the low-news portfolio (NRANK=1). In other words, there is no discernible
post-earnings announcement drift when there is little competing news that distracts in-
vestors from the earnings news. The hedge portfolio returns across NRANK are not
monotonic, possibly due to small firm sizes in the second number of announcement
quintile (deciles 3 and 4 in Table 2).
The “fund-of-fund” portfolio, which is formed by going long in the high-news hedge
portfolio and short the low-news hedge portfolio, has a 3-factor alpha of 0.86% which
is significant at the 10% level. This indicates that the post-announcement drift portfo-
lio strategy using high-news day announcements earns marginally higher returns than
that using low-news day announcements. Also the evidence suggests that the higher
profitability of high-news portfolio is mainly due to greater distraction effect on positive
news. The 3-factor alpha of the high-minus-low portfolio (NRANK5-NRANK1; last row
of Table 8) which is long in high-news portfolio and short in low-news portfolio is 0.48%
(significant at 10% level) for the top earnings surprise quintile (FE=5) while it is −0.38%
and insignificant for the bottom earnings surprise quintile (FE=1).
The portfolio strategy findings confirm the univariate and regression results that post
earnings announcement drift is stronger for earnings announcements made on high-news
days than low-news days. The portfolio findings also indicate that, in the absence of
transactions costs, the amount of distraction on the day of the earnings announcement
is useful information for an investor who seeks to exploit post-earnings announcement
drift to achieve superior returns.
7 Related versus Unrelated Announcements
So far we have treated all announcements by other firms alike. However, it is possible
that not all competing announcements are distracting. If two firms are closely related,
an announcement by a one firm might attract attention to the other. For example,
Google’s announcement of its earnings may attract investors’ attention to earnings an-
nouncements by other internet portal firms, and distract investor attention from the
earnings announcements of totally unrelated firms. On the other hand, announcements
by related firms can be more distracting to investors who specialize in a particular sector.
Therefore, it will be interesting to examine how related and unrelated announcements
affect market reactions to earnings news differently.
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We identify firm relatedness by whether they are in the same industry using the
Fama-French 10 industry classification. The number of related announcements is the
number of earnings announcements by same-industry firms; the number of unrelated
announcements is the number of announcements by firms in other industries. Since
Industry 10 in the Fama-French classification is defined as ‘others’ which do not belong
to any of the pre-defined categories, we limit the analysis to Industries 1-9.
In the regression analyses, we interact the earnings surprise decile rank (FE) deciles
with the number of related announcements decile (NrelRank) or the number of unre-
lated announcements decile (NunrelRank) to test the effect of related and unrelated
announcements on investor reactions to earnings news. To address the possibility that
some industries on average may have a larger number of related or unrelated announce-
ments, the number of related/unrelated announcements deciles (NrelRank/NunrelRank)
are based on quarterly sorts by the number of related/unrelated announcements within
each industry.20
Table 9 shows that unrelated news distracts investors more strongly than related
news. The number of related or unrelated announcements lowers the sensitivity of an-
nouncement returns to earnings news when we examine them separately; the coefficient
of the interaction term of earnings surprise and the number of related announcement
deciles (FE×NrelRank) is −0.015 and significant at the 1% level in Regression 1, and
the coefficient of the interaction term of earnings surprise and the number of unre-
lated announcement deciles (FE×NunrelRank) is −0.021 and significant at the 1% level
in Regression 2. When we include both variables, the effect of unrelated news domi-
nates that of related news; FE×NunrelRank is negative significant at the 5% level and
FE×NrelRank is insignificant in Regression 3.
We also examine the effect of related and unrelated announcements on post-earnings
announcement drift. We find complementary results; the number of unrelated announce-
ments increases the sensitivity of post-announcement returns to earnings news whether
or not related announcements are included, but the effect of related news is not signif-
icant. The coefficient estimates for the interaction term FE×NunrelRank are positive
and significant at the 5% level in Regressions 5 and 6, while the coefficient estimates for
the interaction term FE×NrelRank are insignificant in Regressions 4 and 6. In summary,
Table 9 provides evidence that it is primarily unrelated news firms that mutes the initial
market reaction to earnings news, and thereby intensifies post-earnings announcement
drift.
20The results are similar when we form the number of related/unrelated announcements deciles using
all sample firms and control for possible industry effects by including industry dummies.
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8 Why Distraction Can Affect Security Prices
A limited attention explanation for an asset pricing pattern must explain why investors
who are not paying full attention would participate in markets and affect prices, and why
any such effects are not eliminated by the trades of fully rational arbitrageurs. The issue
of arbitrage has been addressed by many papers in behavioral finance; if the risk-bearing
capacity of fully rational individuals is finite, then their beliefs do not dominate prices
in the short run; instead, prices reflect a weighted average of investor beliefs, where the
weights depend on the frequencies of different investor types in the population and on
their risk tolerance.21
In the long run, we might expect wealth on average to flow from less rational traders
to more rational traders, which could diminish the influence of imperfectly rational
traders on prices. Again, this is a standard issue in the behavioral finance literature,
and there are some standard responses: that stock prices are noisy so that this wealth-
transfer process can be slow, that in the long run new generations of naive traders
enter the market, and that owing either to aging or to psychological biases in learning
processes some investors may learn to be less rather than more rational over time.
In the specific context of limited attention, owing to cognitive resource constraints,
all investors have limited attention, so there is no way for a flow of wealth to fully
eliminate its effects (see, e.g., Hirshleifer and Teoh (2005)). Even if some investors
allocate resources heavily to the study of a given stock at a given time, and therefore are
highly attentive toward that stock, this entails withdrawal of cognitive resources from
other activities, so we cannot conclude that wealth will tend to flow toward such an
investor.
A different argument set of arguments against limited attention affecting security
pricing are based on investors being able to adjust intelligently to deal with limited
attention. For example, one can leverage attention by focusing on more important
signals. However, it can be hard to know how important an item is until it is carefully
processed.
Alternatively, an investor who is neglecting relevant public information about a stock
could withdraw from trading in that stock, so that his beliefs are not reflected in its
price. However, the same processing and memory constraints that cause neglect of a
signal also make it hard to compensate optimally for the failure to attend to it. For
example, an investor whose valuation disagrees with the market price may inattentively
fail to reason through why the market price differs from his own valuation. Experimental
evidence that the presentation format of decision problems affects choice (e.g., Tversky
21In the context of reactions to earnings news, see the model of Hirshleifer and Teoh (2005).
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and Kahneman (1981)) indicates that individuals do not compensate optimally for the
limitations in their information processing. Empirically, there are strong indications that
investors are very willing to trade even when they do not possess superior valuations
(Barber and Odean (2000)).22
Other psychological evidence also indicates that individuals do not fully compen-
sate for the fact that they do not possess all relevant information. For example, when
presented with one-sided arguments and evidence and asked to judge a legal dispute,
experimental subjects were biased in favor of the side they heard (Brenner, Koehler,
and Tversky (1996)). As the authors state, “The results indicate that people do not
compensate sufficiently for missing information even when it is painfully obvious that
the information available to them is incomplete.”
Furthermore, we argue that it is reasonable to trade even though one is neglecting
some information. Traditional models of information and securities markets such as
Grossman and Stiglitz (1976) provide the insight that, owing to liquidity or noise trading,
prices aggregate information imperfectly. In consequence, these models imply that even
an uninformed individual who is trading against others who are better informed should
trade based upon his beliefs rather than lapsing into passivity. Intuitively, such an
investor benefits by supplying liquidity to the market, and taking advantage of any
mispricing created by liquidity trades. Analogously, even an investor who neglects a
public signal can benefit from contrarian trading (e.g., through limit orders) based upon
his beliefs. Such contrarian trading could on average be profitable23, yet could also
induce price underreaction to public news events such as earnings announcements.
9 Concluding Remarks
This paper contributes to a growing literature indicating that limited investor atten-
tion has important effects. A distinctive aspect of our tests is a specific focus on the
extraneous news that is the presumptive source of possible investor neglect of relevant
news. We propose the investor distraction hypothesis, which holds that the arrival of
extraneous earnings news causes trading volume and market prices to react sluggishly
to relevant news about a firm. Specifically, we test the investor distraction hypothesis
22An additional possible source of such neglect is overconfidence, a well-documented psychological
bias. An overconfident individual who wrongly thinks that he has already incorporated the most the
important signals may not perceive the urgency of adjusting for the fact that he is neglecting a relevant
public signal.
23Kaniel, Saar, and Titman (2004) find that contrarian trading allows U.S. individual investors to
earn positive excess returns in the month after their trades; Linnainmaa (2003) finds that individual
day traders in Finland provide liquidity to the market through limit orders and on average profit during
the day by doing so.
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by examining how the number of earnings announcements by other firms affects the sen-
sitivity of a firm’s volume, announcement-period return, and post-event return reaction
to its earnings surprise.
Our evidence indicates that the presence of a large number of competing earnings
announcements by other firms is associated with a weaker announcement-date price
reaction to a firm’s own earnings surprise, a lower volume reaction, and stronger sub-
sequent post-earnings announcement drift. A portfolio trading strategy that exploits
post-earnings announcement drift achieves superior performance when implemented on
earnings announcements on days with a large number of competing announcements than
those on days with little competing news. Competing announcements made by firms in
other industries have a stronger distraction effect, whereas those by same-industry firms
do not have a significant effect.
These findings generally support the investor distraction hypothesis. Furthermore,
they indirectly suggest that investors’ limited attention may drive the basic anomaly,
post-earnings announcement drift. More broadly, this evidence raises the possibility that
limited attention is the source of the general pattern documented in several studies of
underreaction to a variety of public corporate news events.
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Figure 1.  Market Reactions to Earnings News: CAR[0,1] 
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Figure 2. Post-Earnings Announcement Drift: CAR[2,61] 
 
Figure 1 and Figure 2 show the average 2-day announcement cumulative abnormal returns (CAR[0,1]) and 60-day 
post-announcement cumulative abnormal returns (CAR[2,61]) of quarterly earnings announcements against 
earnings surprise deciles (1: bad news – 10: good news) for announcements on high-news days (number of 
announcements decile 10) and those on low-news days (number of announcements decile 1).  Earnings surprise and 
number of announcement deciles are formed based on a quarterly independent double sort of quarterly earnings 
announcements by the corresponding forecast error and the number of quarterly earnings announcements on the day 
of announcement. 
 
 
 
Table 1.  Descriptive Statistics of Daily Number of Earnings Announcements  
 
Quarterly earnings announcement dates are from CRSP-Compustat merged database and IBES for the period from 
January 1995 to December 2004.   We use the earnings announcement date from Compustat when the firm is not 
covered by IBES or when Compustat and IBES dates agree, and use the earlier date when Compustat and IBES 
announcement dates differ. Weekend earnings announcements are excluded from the sample.  The daily number of 
announcements is the total number of quarterly earnings announcements on each day. 
 
 
Panel A.  Distribution of Daily Number of Announcements  
 
  Percentiles 
Mean Std. Dev P10 P25 Median P75 P90 
120.8 129.7 20 33 71 175 290 
 
 
Panel B.  Mean and Median Number of Announcements a Day, by Day of Week/Month/Year 
 
 Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday 
Mean 103.7 140.2 138.9 152.2 68.8 
Median 62 78 77 90 53 
 
 
 Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
Mean 116.8 145.4 78.5 195 155.2 32.7 176.5 148.7 34 174.1 154.3 32.4 
Median 86 147 68.5 142 123 30 122.5 107 32 128 118.5 31 
 
 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Mean 100.4 107 112.4 117 121.3 145.5 138.1 130.9 120.4 114.5 
Median 62 72 76 66 70 86.5 78 72 66 66 
 
 
 
Table 2.  Firm Characteristics by the Number of Announcements Deciles 
 
In each calendar quarter, we sort quarterly earnings announcements during that quarter with earnings surprise 
(forecast error), size, and book-to-market (B/M) information into deciles by the number of announcements on the 
day of the announcement. The number of announcements is the total number of quarterly earnings announcements 
by all firms covered by CRSP-Compustat on the same day.  Table 2 reports the average size and B/M by the 
number of announcements deciles and the difference of size and B/M between deciles 10 and 1 with p-values.  The 
size and B/M values are calculated at the end of June of each year based on the market value of equity at the end of 
June and the book value of equity for the last fiscal year end in the previous calendar year divided by the market 
value of equity for December of the previous calendar year.  
 
 
 Size B/M 
Decile1 (low-news days) 2347.1 0.662 
2 2916.5 0.799 
3 2347.8 0.946 
4 2216.8 0.831 
5 2718.9 0.756 
6 3347.3 0.742 
7 3076.7 0.714 
8 3284.2 0.664 
9 3434.4 0.679 
Decile10 (high-news days)  3228.8 0.789 
Difference (10-1) 881.7 0.127 
p-value <0.001 0.128 
 
 
Table 3. Cumulative Abnormal Returns of Extreme Earnings Surprise Deciles  
By Number of Announcements Deciles 
 
Using quarterly earnings announcements from January 1995 to December 2004, we calculate the average 2-day 
announcement cumulative abnormal returns (CAR[0,1]) and 60-day post-announcement cumulative abnormal 
returns (CAR[2,61]) for extreme earnings surprise deciles (FE10: good news, FE1: bad news) for each number of 
announcements deciles (NRANK).  Earnings surprise and number of announcement deciles are formed based on 
quarterly independent double sorts of quarterly earnings announcements by the corresponding forecast error and the 
number of quarterly earnings announcements on the day of announcement. The significance of the return spread 
between good and bad news firms (FE10-FE1) is marked by * (significant at 5%) and ** (significant at 1%). 
 
 
Average CAR[0,1] for Earnings 
surprise deciles 10 and 1 
 Average CAR[2,61] for Earnings 
surprise deciles 10 and 1 NRANK 
FE1 FE10 FE10 −FE1  FE1 FE10 FE10−FE1 
1 (low-news days) −3.27% 3.81% 7.07%**  −0.99% 1.82% 2.81% 
2 −3.31% 3.45% 6.76%**  −1.67% 3.10% 4.77%**
3 −3.22% 3.52% 6.74%**  −2.09% 2.09% 4.18%**
4 −3.54% 2.50% 6.04%**  −4.79% 3.25% 8.04%**
5 −3.37% 2.22% 5.59%**  −2.19% 2.24% 4.43%**
6 −3.17% 3.16% 6.33%**    0.96% 4.17% 3.21% 
7 −3.67% 2.82% 6.49%**  −3.32% 2.32% 5.64%**
8 −3.45% 2.79% 6.24%**  −2.68% 6.30% 8.98%**
9 −3.49% 2.83% 6.32%**  −1.21% 4.16% 5.37%**
10 (high-news days) −3.06% 2.61% 5.67%**  −2.97% 4.44% 7.41%**
Difference (10−1) 0.20% −1.20%** −1.40%*  −1.98% 2.62% 4.60%*
Table 4.  Market Reactions to Earnings News: Regression Analysis 
 
Table 4 reports the multivariate tests of the effects of the number of announcements on the relation between 
announcement and post-announcement returns and earnings surprises. FE is the earnings surprise deciles (FE=1: lowest, 
10: highest) and NRANK is the number of announcement deciles based on quarterly independent sorts by forecast 
errors and the number of announcements on the day of announcement.  SIZE is the size decile and BM is the book-to-
market decile based on the most recent June size and book-to-market ratio of the firm using NYSE breakpoints, 
#Analysts is the number of analysts following the firm during the most recent fiscal year, LAG is the reporting lag 
defined as the number of days from the quarter end until the announcement date, and IO is the percentage of shares 
owned by institutions.  Also included are year, month, and day of week dummies, and their interaction terms of FE. 
Standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustering by the day of announcement are in parentheses 
 (* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%). 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 CAR[0,1] CAR[0,1] CAR[0,1] CAR[0,1] CAR[2,61] CAR[2.61] CAR[2.61] CAR[2.61] 
FE 1.027*** 1.046*** 1.080*** 1.074*** 1.016*** 0.924*** 0.917*** 0.895***
 (0.070) (0.071) (0.073) (0.072) (0.239) (0.244) (0.250) (0.251) 
NRANK 0.073** 0.068** 0.068** 0.067** −0.297*** −0.274** −0.287*** −0.281***
 (0.031) (0.032) (0.031) (0.031) (0.108) (0.108) (0.107) (0.108) 
FE×NRANK −0.021*** −0.024*** −0.030*** −0.029*** 0.049*** 0.064*** 0.066*** 0.070***
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.018) (0.021) (0.024) (0.024) 
SIZE 0.267*** 0.267*** 0.267*** 0.267*** −0.012 −0.014 −0.013 −0.014 
 (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.102) (0.102) (0.102) (0.102) 
FE×SIZE −0.040*** −0.046*** -0.041*** −0.040*** −0.054*** −0.027 −0.053*** −0.053***
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.016) (0.020) (0.016) (0.016) 
BM 0.250*** 0.250*** 0.250*** 0.250*** −0.174*** −0.173*** −0.174*** −0.174***
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.067) (0.067) (0.067) (0.067) 
FE×BM −0.034*** −0.034*** -0.034*** -0.034*** 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
LAG 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.020 0.021 0.021 0.021 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
FE×LAG −0.007*** −0.007*** −0.007*** −0.007*** −0.008*** −0.008*** −0.008*** −0.007***
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Log(1+#Analysts) −0.437*** −0.437*** −0.436*** −0.437*** 1.496*** 1.496*** 1.494*** 1.497***
 (0.109) (0.109) (0.109) (0.109) (0.370) (0.370) (0.370) (0.370) 
FE×Log(1+#Analysts) 0.051*** 0.051*** 0.023 0.052*** −0.153*** −0.153*** −0.101 −0.154***
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.021) (0.018) (0.059) (0.059) (0.067) (0.059) 
IO −1.255*** −1.255*** -1.256*** -1.254*** −0.200 −0.199 −0.198 −0.203 
 (0.284) (0.284) (0.284) (0.284) (0.919) (0.919) (0.919) (0.919) 
FE×IO 0.342*** 0.342*** 0.343*** 0.236*** 0.040 0.041 0.039 0.309 
 (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.058) (0.146) (0.146) (0.146) (0.203) 
FE×NRANK×SIZE  0.001*    −0.004*   
  (0.001)    (0.002)   
FE×NRANK   0.005***    −0.009  
×Log(1+#Analysts)   (0.002)    (0.007)  
FE×NRANK×IO    0.019***    −0.048 
    (0.006)    (0.029) 
Calendar dummies,  
interacted with FE 
X X X X X X X X 
Constant −5.872*** −5.840*** −5.836*** −5.835*** −5.748*** −5.897*** −5.816*** −5.844***
 (0.436) (0.437) (0.436) (0.436) (1.535) (1.538) (1.534) (1.535) 
Observations 117,640 117,640 117,640 117,640 116,414 116,414 116,414 116,414 
R-squared 5.6% 5.6% 5.6% 5.6% 0.9% 0.9% 0.9% 0.9% 
 
  
 
Table 5.  Market Reactions to Earnings News: Additional Analysis  
 
Table 5 reports the multivariate tests of the effects of the number of announcements on the relation between returns 
and earnings surprises. FE is the earnings surprise deciles (FE=1: lowest, 10: highest) and NRANK is the number 
of announcement deciles based on quarterly independent sorts by forecast errors and the number of announcements 
on the day of announcement.  Control variables include size deciles and book-to-market (B/M) deciles based on the 
most recent June size and book-to-market ratio of the firm using NYSE breakpoints, the number of analysts 
following the firm during the most recent fiscal year (log(1+# analysts following)), reporting lags (the number of 
days from the quarter end until the announcement date), the percentage of shares owned by institutions 
(institutional ownership), year, month, and day of week dummies, and interaction terms of FE with all control 
variables.  Standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustering by the day of announcement are in 
parentheses (* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%). 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 CAR[-1,1] CAR[3,61] CAR[-30,-1] CAR[0,61] 
FE 1.154*** 1.100*** 1.796*** 2.117***
 (0.075) (0.235) (0.161) (0.255) 
NRANK 0.057* −0.264** 0.079 −0.192*
 (0.033) (0.104) (0.078) (0.115) 
FE×NRANK −0.021*** 0.046*** −0.017 0.024 
 (0.005) (0.018) (0.013) (0.020) 
Controls, interacted with FE X X X X 
     
Constant −5.907*** −6.052*** −5.197*** −11.911***
 (0.472) (1.500) (0.969) (1.575) 
# Observations 117,639 116,414 117,639 116,414 
R-squared 5.8% 0.9% 2.5% 2.1% 
 
Controls: Size and B/M deciles, log(1+# analysts following), reporting lags, institutional ownership, year, month, 
and day of week dummies. Interaction terms of FE with all control variables are also included. 
   
 
  
 
 
Table 6.  Positive versus Negative Earnings Surprises 
 
Table 6 reports multivariate tests of the effects of the number of announcements on the relation between returns and 
earnings surprises, separately for positive and negative earnings surprises. NRANK is the number of announcement 
deciles and FE is the earnings surprise quintile within each subsample of positive and negative surprises (FE = 1: 
lowest, 5: highest). Control variables include size deciles and book-to-market (B/M) deciles based on the most 
recent June size and book-to-market ratio of the firm using NYSE breakpoints, the number of analysts following 
the firm during the most recent fiscal year (log(1+# analysts following)), reporting lags (the number of days from 
the quarter end until the announcement date), the percentage of shares owned by institutions (institutional 
ownership), year, month, and day of week dummies, and interaction terms of FE with all control variables. 
Standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustering by the day of announcement are in parentheses 
(* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%). 
 
 
 Positive Earnings Surprises Negative Earnings Surprises
 CAR[0,1] CAR[2,61] CAR[0,61] CAR[0,1] CAR[2,61] CAR[0,61] 
FE 1.475*** 0.957 2.582*** 0.538** −1.133 −0.277 
 (0.178) (0.634) (0.694) (0.257) (0.819) (0.834) 
NRANK 0.032 −0.345** −0.292** −0.005 −0.593*** −0.526**
 (0.039) (0.135) (0.147) (0.067) (0.224) (0.233) 
FE×NRANK −0.039*** 0.120** 0.074 0.015 0.156*** 0.153**
 (0.013) (0.049) (0.055) (0.018) (0.059) (0.061) 
Controls, 
interacted with FE X X X X X X 
       
Constant −2.401*** −0.528 −3.173 −5.224*** −1.581 −7.779**
 (0.532) (1.921) (2.055) (0.955) (3.146) (3.187) 
# Observations 64,231 63,643 63,643 36,584 36,064 36,064 
R-squared 2.0% 1.1% 1.7% 2.0% 1.6% 1.5% 
Controls: Size and B/M deciles, log(1+# analysts following), reporting lags, institutional ownership, year, 
month, and day of week dummies. Interaction terms of FE with all control variables are also included. 
  
 
 
Table 7: Trading Volume Response to Earnings News 
 
We perform multivariate analysis of the effect of competing annoucements on trading volume response to earnings 
news. The dependent variable is one- or two-day abnormal trading volume (VOL[0], VOL[0,1]).  Abnormal trading 
volume on a given day is defined as the log dollar trading volume on that day normalized by the average log dollar 
trading volume over days [-41,-11] of the announcement. VOL[0] is the abnormal trading volume on the 
announcement date and VOL[0,1] is the average abnormal trading volume over days [0,1] of the announcement.  
AFE is the absolute earnings surprise deciles and NRANK is the number of announcements deciles based on 
quarterly independent sorts by absolute forecast errors and the number of announcements on the day of 
announcement. Regressions (3) and (6) use indicator variables for each earnings surprise deciles. MKTVOL is the 
market abnormal trading volume on the announcement date and MKTVOL2 is the 2-day market abnormal trading 
volume over days [0,1] of the announcement. Other control variables include size and book-to-market (B/M) 
deciles based on the most recent June size and book-to-market ratio of the firm using NYSE breakpoints the 
number of analysts following the firm during the most recent fiscal year (log(1+# analysts following)), reporting 
lags (the number of days from the quarter end until the announcement date), the percentage of shares owned by 
institutions (institutional ownership), year, month, and day of week dummies.  Standard errors adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and clustering by the day of announcement are in parentheses (* significant at 10%; ** significant 
at 5%; *** significant at 1%).  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 VOL[0] VOL[0] VOL[0] VOL[0,1] VOL[0,1] VOL[0,1] 
AFE 0.031*** 0.031***  0.030*** 0.029***  
 (0.002) (0.002)  (0.001) (0.001)  
NRANK −0.022*** −0.028*** −0.028*** −0.022*** −0.029*** −0.029***
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Dummy variables 
for FE deciles   X   X 
       
MKTVOL  0.779*** 0.781***    
  (0.044) (0.043)    
MKTVOL2     0.818*** 0.820***
     (0.046) (0.046) 
Controls  X X  X X 
       
Constant 0.470*** 0.634*** 0.686*** 0.530*** 0.718*** 0.794***
 (0.016) (0.036) (0.038) (0.014) (0.032) (0.034) 
# Observations 117,640 117,640 117,640 117,640 117,640 117,640 
R-squared 0.7% 3.0% 3.0% 1.0% 4.2% 4.4% 
 
Controls: Size and B/M deciles, log(1+# analysts following), reporting lags, institutional ownership, year, 
month, and day of week dummies. 
 
 
Table 8: Fama-French Alphas of Post-Earnings Announcement Drift Portfolios 
  
At the end of each month from March 1995 until December 2004, we independently sort stocks into 5x5 groups 
based on their most recent quarterly earnings surprises within the last three months (FE=1~5) and the number 
earnings announcements on the day of earnings announcement (NRANK=1~5). We calculate equally-weighted 
returns of the resulting 5x5 portfolios during the following month.   Within each of number of announcements rank 
(NRANK), we form a hedge portfolio that is long in good news portfolio (FE=5) and short in bad news portfolio 
(FE=1) to exploit post-earnings announcement drifts. Alphas from time-series regressions of portfolio monthly 
returns (less the risk-free rate except for the zero-cost hedge portfolios) on Fama-French three factors are reported 
with Newey-West standard errors with 12 lags are in parentheses (* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%).  The first row reports the alphas of the base post-earnings announcement drift portfolios equally 
weighting firms in each earnings surprise quintile.  The last row reports the alphas of hedge portfolios long in high-
news day portfolio (NRANK=5) and short in the low-news day portfolio (NRANK=1) within each earnings 
surprise quintile.   
 
 
 
  Earnings Surprise Quintile  
 FE=1  (Bad news) 
2 3 4 FE=5  
 
FE5-FE1  (Good news) (Good −Bad)  All  −0.57 −0.53*** −0.12 0.04 0.75*** 1.32***  (0.36) (0.20) (0.14) (0.14) (0.26) (0.26)  NRANK 1 −0.21% −0.53** −0.17 0.04 0.56** 0.77   (0.42) (0.22) (0.21) (0.21) (0.24) (0.47)  1.55***2 −1.10*** −0.56** −0.04 −0.23 0.45   (0.37) (0.24) (0.21) (0.18) (0.28) (0.26) 
 3 −0.51 −0.61*** 0.02 −0.02 0.70** 1.22***
  (0.43) (0.23) (0.17) (0.15) (0.30) (0.37) 
4 −0.16 −0.56** −0.26 0.32 0.94*** 1.09***
 (0.50) (0.25) (0.16) (0.20) (0.34) (0.40) 
NRANK 5 −0.60* −0.44*** −0.15 0.06 1.04*** 1.64***
 (0.34) (0.17) (0.14) (0.17) (0.34) (0.31) 
NRANK5  −0.38 0.09 0.03 0.02 0.48* 0.86*
− NRANK1 (0.33) (0.16) (0.20) (0.21) (0.24) (0.47) 
 
 
Table 9: The Effect of Related vs. Unrelated Announcements 
 
We examine the effect of the number of related and unrelated announcements on the 2-day announcement 
cumulative abnormal returns (CAR[0,1]) and the 60-day post-announcement cumulative abnormal returns 
(CAR[2,61]). We calculate the daily number of quarterly earnings announcements for each industry using Fama-
French 10 industry classification.  The number of related announcements is the number of quarterly earnings 
announcements by the same industry firms, and the number of unrelated announcements is the number of quarterly 
earnings announcements by firms in other industries.  FE is the earnings surprise deciles (FE=1: lowest, 10: 
highest) based on quarterly sorts by forecast errors using all observations, and NrelRank/NunrelRank is the decile 
rank of the number of related/unrelated announcements (10: highest, 1: lowest) announcements based on quarterly 
sorts by the number of related/unrelated announcements within each industry.  We exclude firms in Industry 10 
('Others'). Control variables include size deciles and book-to-market (B/M) deciles based on the most recent June 
size and book-to-market ratio of the firm using NYSE breakpoints, the number of analysts following the firm 
during the most recent fiscal year, reporting lags (the number of days from the quarter end until the announcement 
date), the percentage of shares owned by institutions (institutional ownership), year, month, and day of week 
dummies, and interaction terms of FE with all control variables. Standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and 
clustering by the day of announcement are in parentheses (* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant 
at 1%). 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 CAR[0,1] CAR[0,1] CAR[0,1] CAR[2,61] CAR[2,61] CAR[2,61] 
FE 0.976*** 1.019*** 1.022*** 0.907*** 0.741*** 0.748***
 (0.075) (0.079) (0.079) (0.252) (0.271) (0.270) 
NrelRank 0.063**  0.010 −0.244**  -0.044 
 (0.032)  (0.039) (0.105)  (0.141) 
 
Controls: Size and B/M deciles, log(1+# analysts following), reporting lags, institutional ownership, year, month, 
and day of week dummies. Interaction terms of FE with all control variables are also included. 
 
FE×NrelRank −0.015***  −0.004 0.026  -0.011 
 (0.005)  (0.006) (0.017)  (0.022) 
NunrelRank  0.092** 0.084*  −0.355*** −0.321*
  (0.036) (0.046)  (0.123) (0.165) 
FE×NunrelRank  −0.021*** −0.018**  0.052** 0.061**
  (0.006) (0.007)  (0.021) (0.028) 
Controls, 
interacted with FE X X X X X X 
Constant −5.941*** −6.154*** −6.163*** −5.765*** −4.939*** −4.921***
 (0.470) (0.492) (0.493) (1.658) (1.761) (1.760) 
Observations 92,685 92,685 92,685 91,737 91,737 91,737 
R-squared 5.7% 5.7% 5.7% 1.1% 1.1% 1.1% 
